In Armenia
First impressions of close countries
It’s a long time that I have been meaning to visit Armenia, and so it’s good to have finally made it here. The country is of course just across a (for now) closed border from Türkiye, and multiple linguistic, cultural and culinary similarities are quickly apparent; from the word for glass (bardak), to the existence of lahmacun/lahmaju and dolma and many other things besides.
I intend to write a few posts while I’m here, as well as working on some longer pieces of work. So far I’ve spent a week walking around Yerevan, though can’t claim much tourism beyond my regular watching of a city from its cafes, streets and bars. From Yerevan I’ve taken a 3hour train ride up to Lake Sevan (price about €3), an enormous lake surrounded by dry, thin grasses and high mountains, the setting and appearance of which is as identical as can be to Lake Van in the east of Türkiye. This is hardly surprising once you remember that the two lakes are neighbours not much more than a hundred miles apart.
As with the visibility of Ağrı Dağı / Mount Ararat on a clear day in Yerevan, it is incredible to think of how two places so close and connected have been - both on the ground but also the Western ordering of history - filed away so separately, to the point at which the strength of an emotional border, even if you reject it, can make you forget the shared destiny of geography. I am writing this now up in the hills and the cooler climate of Dilijan.
I give a lot of thought (probably too much) to how to counter the fact that much of the Western discourse around Turkish politics is crafted by those with actively negative agendas (lobbyists), or are media depictions shaped by lobbyists, or the unfortunate tendency for those who know least to want to say it loudest, while those who know a little more instead quietly ponder all they do not know.
Responding, even constructively, to a negative discourse keeps the subject framed on its terms. Not engaging the discourse at all can end up leaving the field clear to it. As is often the case, the ideal is probably somewhere in the middle, while also - where possible - trying to introduce new ideas and food for thought that can help constructively shape what people are talking about in the first place.
Turkish-Armenian relations are, of course, one of the finest examples of a subject that is left or made deliberately polarised by those who either want to keep it that way or behave so carelessly and obnoxiously that it is as if they do. The result of a discourse on such terms is that more moderate voices are marginalised in it, and the nature of conversation is made so unpleasant that those who value compromise tend not to want to participate in the first place.
All this only compounds the initial problem, but Turkish-Armenian politics are sufficiently important, and in many ways quite simple, that I feel it of value to write something that might be helpful to those outside of the countries. I’ll bring out some specific issues in future posts, but for now set out the key issues to understand.
Türkiye and Armenia are said to be close to reopening borders and full diplomatic relations, something that would be fantastic for the populations of both countries, especially the Turkish regions near the border that would benefit greatly from trade with their neighbour.
The most important thing for Westerners to understand is that Türkiye and Armenia enjoyed full diplomatic relations in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Armenia voted to become independent.
Türkiye broke-off relations with Armenia in 1993, after Armenia invaded the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno Karabakh. Atrocities were committed on both sides, and the conflict was exacerbated by Soviet collapse, but at-root this was an invasion of Azerbaijani territory by Armenia, leaving thousands dead and some million Azerbaijani refugees displaced within Azerbaijan. The Turkish decision to sever relations in 1993 was a show of Turkish support with Azerbaijan and its Turkic population.
A three-decade military build-up, funded by Azerbaijan’s sizeable Caspian gas reserves, saw Azerbaijan retake Nagorno-Karabakh in a war in 2020. Where Armenia once brutalised and expelled the ethnic Azeri population of Karabakh, now Azerbaijan, having retaken their territory, brutalises the remaining ethnically Armenian population.
This situation has intensified recently with Azerbaijan’s brutal blockade of the Lachin Corridor through which - despite an otherwise closed border - supplies were to be transported from Armenia to Armenians in Karabakh. This recent thread on Twitter provides a balanced appraisal of the humanitarian consequences of the blockade, and the military and political goals informing it.
In a conflict spanning decades, with many atrocities committed, it is certain that some would take issue with some elements in the above description. Against all the detail and hurt and obscene polarisation, the above account emphasises simplicity for those fortunate enough to be blessedly unfamiliar with the basis of the conflict.
Given the close relations between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, it is my view that the Turkish state should pressure the Azerbaijani state to cease the blockade of Lachin and, now that Karabakh has been restored to it, sign a peace treaty with Armenia. It is certain, given the far lesser nature of Turkish-Armenian dispute, that Türkiye and Armenia would be able to normalise relations before Azerbaijan and Armenia.
This then, is the reason that Türkiye and Armenia do not presently have relations. There have been recent extensions of mutual goodwill, diplomatic channels are being opened, and Armenia sent a search and rescue team to help in the aftermath of the February earthquake in Türkiye.
To keep this short, I am not writing here of historical matters between the two populations, but will turn to that in a future post. I regard history to be of paramount importance in understanding the present, but also believe that we should never indulge history at the expense of the present.
The Western fixation on historical Turkish-Armenian relations, despite contemporary Turkish-Armenian relations being in the first place a factor of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations (which in turn make Türkiye-Armenia relations look positively rosy by comparison) is very much an example of the latter.